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Forum
Environmentalist thinking and/in geography
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Contributors: Elizabeth E. Watson, Ian Simmons, 
Felipe Fernández-Armesto and Andrew Sluyter
Abstract: In recent years, a new type of determinist environmental thinking has emerged. It 
can be understood to be one strand in a much broader realm of ‘environment talk’. Many human 
geographers have expressed a combination of scepticism and surprise at the apparently inexorable 
rise of the neo-environmentalist arguments which differ from early twentieth-century environmental 
determinism yet continue to draw upon biologistic accounts of human culture. Although geography 
has in recent years been at the forefront of the academic discussions of environmental change 
in relation to science, institutional context, political costs and human impacts, the discipline 
nevertheless has to contend with a widespread misperception of the place of environment in human 
affairs and the world’s future. This Forum discusses the context for the rise of, and consequences 
of, determinist accounts.
Key words: geographical explanations, global development, global inequality, human-animal 
relations, neo-environmental determinism, political ecology.
Introduction: the status of the 
‘environment’ in geographical 
explanations
The immediate stimulus for this Forum is the 
perception among a number of geographers 
across the subfields of their discipline that 
‘the environment’ has in certain spheres been 
brought into arguments that attribute it with 
powerful and singular causal power; and, 
moreover, that these arguments have been 
associated with the discipline in ways that 
have various effects on the nature of geo-
graphical explanations and their public 
prominence.
In recent years a certain type of deter-
minist environmental thinking has emerged. 
It can be understood to be one strand in a 
broader discourse of what we can call aca-
demic ‘environment talk’ (which includes 
political ecology, environmental history, 
climatology, and many others). Yet this ‘neo-
environmental determinism’ (Sluyter, this 
Forum) is characterized by an emphasis on 
the core explanatory power of non-human/
non-animal components of the biophysical 
sphere in shaping human outcomes (in rela-
tion to development, disease, conflict, re-
sponses to climate change, etc). Whereas 
other forms of environmental talk, such as 
political ecology (eg, Peet and Watts, 2004), 
highlight the contingent historically and geo-
graphically specific cultural meanings and 
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human engagements with environmental 
processes, neo-environmental determinism 
claims to discern invariable dynamics be-
tween (certain kinds of) society and ‘the’ en-
vironment. These determinist frameworks 
differ from early twentieth-century versions 
of environmental determinism in a number of 
ways.1 First, in intellectual terms, recent de-
terminisms have emerged in the context of 
widespread knowledge of Darwinian evolu-
tion, atmospheric and climate science, ‘new 
genetics’, and detailed ecological and social 
knowledges, all of which create a more 
knowledge-rich starting point (while also pro-
viding the basis of robust critiques of these 
same environmental determinisms; see 
below). Second, in terms of sociopolitical con-
texts, current environmental determinisms 
refl ect subtle arguments about ‘cultural’ de-
terminism, rather than crass racial ideologies. 
However, as Felipe Fernández-Armesto 
makes clear (this Forum), the concept 
‘culture’ can be used as if it were equivalent to 
a biologically determined entity, and he 
thereby reveals the biologisms that underlie 
certain strands of neo-environmental deter-
minist thinking.
Many human geographers have expressed 
a combination of scepticism and surprise at 
the apparently inexorable rise of such argu-
ments. Johnston (2007) calls Jared Diamond 
– whose books have often provided a lightn-
ing rod for critique and debate – ‘a late inter-
loper … [but] not [a geographer] really’. 
Yet there has been a surprising lack of dis-
cussion about the implications of the rise of 
neo-environmental determinist arguments. 
Geographical journals have tended to engage 
with these arguments through book reviews, 
as well as indirectly in articles presenting de-
tailed analyses of environment-society rela-
tions (as indeed do numerous books). Yet 
relatively little has been written systemat-
ically about these arguments in terms of 
their validity (or lack of it) within the discip-
line, about their implications for human geo-
graphers’ and environmentalists’ attempts 
to bring non-determinist research to a 
public audience, and the potential long-term 
consequences for the discipline of these high-
profi le representations of ‘geography’.
Hence the diverse contributors to this 
Forum were invited to engage in a broader 
way than they might in scholarly writing and 
teaching with questions about the politics, 
consequences and intellectual basis of these 
arguments, and their connection with their 
own fi elds of inquiry. From varying perspec-
tives, the contributors address questions 
such as the following. Should geography 
engage with environmentally determinist 
arguments in the public arena and other dis-
ciplines? If so, how and to what ends? How do 
existing forms of environmental determinism 
affect the content and form of knowledges 
produced by human and physical geographers 
broadly defi ned? Environmental determinist 
thinking, of course, comprises a number of 
differing arguments, fields of inquiry, and 
publicly accessible discourses – while some 
contributors mention specifi c names, others 
address themselves to what they perceive 
to be wider, more diffuse infl uences of neo-
environmental determinism on public debate.
As noted above, Jared Diamond occupies 
a specifi c position in these debates, not only 
because of the fame and high sales of his 
books, but also because of his appointment 
to and profi le in, professional academic geo-
graphy. Jared Diamond has been appointed 
to the UCLA Geography Department, 
and gave one of the plenaries at the 2007 
American Association of Geographers’ an-
nual meeting, in which he rehearsed the argu-
ments developed in his best-selling books 
Guns, germs and steel and Collapse. Although 
Diamond always attributes environmental 
factors with a partial role in societal change, 
his discussion tends to highlight these factors 
at the cost of others. Yet it is invidious to 
single out one individual, as similar arguments 
(albeit not based on Diamond’s zoological 
research) have also been gaining a wider cur-
rency within public understandings of what 
‘geography’ is (eg, Posner, 2004; cf. Geertz, 
2005). Arguments about conflict in Sudan 
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and elsewhere in Africa are increasingly em-
phasizing the role of climate change, down-
playing the political interpretations that have 
long held sway in the scholarly understand-
ings of famine, conflict and land shortages 
(UNEP, 2007; de Waal, 2007).
One area in which environmentally de-
terminist arguments have gained public – 
although not always professional – salience 
is in relation to global issues and inequality. 
Ian Simmons (Simmons, this Forum) points 
out that geographers need global narratives 
because of the scale and predicted trans-
formative power of global climate change. 
Separately, however, Andrew Sluyter and 
Elizabeth Watson each point out how not 
all global narratives are the same. As neo-
environmental determinist accounts of 
global climate change offer universalizing 
explanations, other types of explanation – 
those that point to legacies of colonialism, 
racially segregated labour markets, or locally 
motivated political confl ict – fade from view 
(Sluyter, this Forum; Watson, this Forum). 
Neo-environmental determinist narratives 
risk obscuring the interactions between local, 
regional, and specifi c global processes by high-
lighting supposedly worldwide processes, 
thereby doing an injustice to the extensive 
work in geography on scalar interactions. Yet, 
in a universalizing picture, the ‘environment’ – 
in the sense of desertifi cation, drought, dis-
ease, and so on – gains a spurious ranking in an 
explanatory framework, while other factors 
such as society, culture, politics, geopolit-
ical relations, and history are pushed into the 
background (compare Adams and Mulligan, 
2003). Tanya Murray Li suggests that ‘en-
gaging simplifications’ may have powerful 
social and political consequences, as they 
appear to offer a route-map for politicians 
and planners alike (Li, 2002).
To the extent that the discipline of geo-
graphy articulates an account of global 
climate change and its various local and re-
gional ramifi cations (from melting polar ice to 
agrarian transformations in the Sahel), it too 
is entangled in the power of such engaging 
simplifi cations. In other words, geography’s 
profi le – as a fi eld of research endeavour, as a 
claimant on public funds, and as a ‘relevant’ 
subject in instrumentally orientated times – 
rests in part on its credentials as a contributor 
to the global climate change debate. The chal-
lenge for geography lies in creating a dis-
cipline that refl ects the complexity of – rather 
than simplifi es – accounts of the world, with-
out losing sight of a synthetic account.
As noted above, neo-environmental deter-
minisms often draw on a biologistic model of 
human culture. They see the concept as a 
tool by which to differentiate one social group 
from another in explanations of relative 
flexibility in face of stress, or adaptability 
to new opportunities. While such accounts 
have certainly replaced nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century racial explanations 
(cf. Sluyter, this Forum), the denial of the 
powerful hierarchies of (racial/cultural) value 
and the strongly infl uential histories and geo-
graphies of colonialism and imperialism speak 
more to progress in laboratory science than to 
the careful, extensively documented and ap-
propriately researched fi ndings of hundreds 
of social scientists (among them geographers) 
over the past 30 years (Kobayashi and Peake, 
2000). By drawing on biological science 
rather than social science, such accounts 
fall prey to the engaging simplifications of 
Malthusian arguments (Simmons, this 
Forum). Yet even laboratory science and 
its fi ndings are only selectively drawn upon. 
For instance, extensive work on the lack 
of easy boundaries between human and 
animal societies and cultures (documented 
in Fernández-Armesto, this Forum) high-
lights the need to rethink our category of 
‘culture’. More importantly in the context of 
this Forum, we need to acknowledge that 
history is the explanatory timeline relevant 
for human-environment relations, rather 
than evolutionary time.
The Forum is in three parts. The first 
comprises a discussion of the various ways in 
which neo-environmental determinism is 
affecting geographers’ sense of their explan-
atory frameworks in the classroom, and 
in public debates. Through books such as 
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Jared Diamond’s Collapse (2005) or Bjørn 
Lomborg’s The skeptical environmentalist 
(2001), professional geographers are re-
minded of the myriad ways in which ‘big’ 
global environmental issues bring students 
into our departments, drive high-level policy 
debates, and remind us how our own per-
sonal research interests only too frequently 
remain constrained in scope and scale con-
tributing incrementally to a wider project of 
expanding and transmitting knowledge 
(Castree et al., 2008). In Part II, there is a dir-
ect refutation of two forms of determinism 
shaping current debate: first, the idea that 
evolution determines the circumstances of 
human groups today and, second, the notion 
that human ‘cultures’ correspond analo-
gously to organisms, and are thus subject to 
evolutionary pressures. As Felipe Fernández-
Armesto argues, neither of these doctrines is 
helpful in offering insight or explanatory frame-
works for social change, nor environment-
society relations. In other words, although 
social scientists have Darwinian evolutionary 
theory in their toolkit as a broad intellectual 
setting, they fi nd its insights too broad-brush 
as a proximate framework to understand, 
to pick a random example, how indigenous 
forest dwellers in Bolivia negotiate with state 
conservation initiatives. In Part III, the con-
text in which neo-environmental deter-
minism emerged is examined. The neoliberal 
political economy of the North in combin-
ation with the South’s continued under-
development are suggested as factors behind 
the public salience of neo-environmentalist 
accounts.
This Forum provides no straightforward 
response to the rise of neo-environmental 
determinism. While certain contributors are 
keen to engage students in the debate, others 
are more concerned to raise issues with uni-
versity administrators and professional 
bodies. But the Forum does, we hope, contri-
bute to what is likely to be an ongoing, and 
at times heated, discussion. It offers us some 
pointers about the stakes involved in the rise 
of neo-environmental determinism, some of 
the intellectual and institutional conseque-
nces. It also suggests that we need constantly 
to interrogate and evaluate critically the ways 
in which forms of knowledge gain power. 
Without advocating that geography engage 
in other ‘simplifi cations’, the contributors to 
this Forum imply that there is still a job to be 
done to make other complex stories acces-
sible and powerful in public debates.
In conclusion, although geography has 
in recent years been at the forefront of the 
academic discussions of environmental 
change in relation to science, institutional con-
text, political costs and human impacts, the 
discipline nevertheless has to contend with 
a widespread misperception of the place of 
environment in human affairs and the world’s 
future. Given its research strengths and pro-
fessional standing, geography – and geo-
graphers – can directly engage with and 
challenge such views, contributing to urgent 
conversations in academia and policy arenas 
alike. This public role must, however, be 
counterbalanced by an awareness of its own 
institutional and professional investments in 
the fi eld of environmental studies. The power 
of ‘environmental big-talk’ to raise geo-
graphy’s profi le, particularly perhaps in coun-
tries where it has not had a large presence 
in universities, must be weighed against the 
risk of simplifying the causal drivers behind 
global environmental and climate changes.
Sarah A. Radcliffe
University of Cambridge
Part I: Types of determinist 
environmental thinking
1 Convenient examples for inconvenient truths
In a Masters on Environment, Society and 
Development that I co-teach with Tim Bayliss-
Smith at the Department of Geography, the 
students are asked to read and debate Jared 
Diamond’s Collapse (2005). Student criticisms 
of his thesis often start with a questioning 
of the way Diamond selects his examples. 
They suggest that perhaps he chooses his 
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cases to support his storyline. Students also 
comment that, although he gives credit to 
non-environmental factors in his fi ve-point 
framework for explaining historical change 
and disintegration of societies, all too often 
the cases are structured in a way that rele-
gates non-environmental factors to a lower 
tier of significance. The Rwandan study is 
a case in point. Diamond makes clear that 
environmental factors were only one contri-
butory factor in the genocide, and that there 
is no automatic link between population 
pressure, competition for scarce natural re-
sources, and confl ict. But he ends by citing 
the work on Rwanda by Gérard Prunier, 
who comments that competition for land 
and livestock was not a ‘negligible incentive’. 
Diamond concludes with the warning that 
‘Malthus’s worst-case scenario may some-
times be realized, and that Rwanda may 
be a distressing model of that scenario in 
operation’ (Diamond, 2005: 327–28). One 
student commented: ‘I read the chapter on 
Rwanda, and I appreciated everything he 
said about other factors, but afterwards, 
all I could remember was that the genocide 
had been caused by population growth and 
environmental pressure.’
The emphasis on the environmental factor 
is also produced by the overall structure of 
Diamond’s book. Each chapter tells a com-
plex story in terms of the interrelations be-
tween social, political, economic and envir-
onmental factors, but the element that links 
them all is that the changes in the environ-
ment have been partly responsible at least 
for the history of each case. By placing all 
of these examples side by side, the reader is 
encouraged to identify this common thread, 
and to conclude that the environment is the 
most signifi cant consideration. Other factors 
that vary from case to case become less im-
portant. This conclusion is also supported by 
Diamond’s more explicit commentary on the 
role of the environment, and the way in which 
analysts have ignored it in recent years.
Diamond’s argument thus reasserts the 
logic of Malthus and others that population 
growth, left unchecked, leads to a ‘natural’ 
chain of events: population growth leads to 
agricultural intensification, expansion onto 
marginal land, unsustainable practices and 
environmental damage; to food shortages, 
starvation, ‘wars among too many people 
fi ghting for too few resources’ and political 
upheaval; to population decrease and ‘loss of 
political, economic and cultural complexity’ 
(Diamond, 2005: 6). The logic of this argu-
ment has been critiqued extensively by geo-
graphers, anthropologists and others, who 
have, for some time now, challenged its over-
simplifi cations. The environmental degrad-
ation narrative continues to endure, despite 
much evidence to the contrary, because it 
serves powerful interests (for a review of 
this critique, see Leach and Mearns, 1996). 
What is striking is that, despite this largely 
accepted critique, Diamond’s reworking of 
Malthus has been warmly received, with 
the book topping the non-fi ction best-selling 
lists. Diamond has been embraced by the 
geographical academy. The welcoming of 
Diamond’s argument represents therefore a 
radical shift, even reversal, in perspective.
The question is why? One explanation is 
in the new context in which we are working: 
the current global environmental crisis is now 
so severe and pressing that Malthusian 
thinking, and the deterministic role of the 
environment, is relevant again.
In effect, the extent of the global environ-
mental crisis has brought with it a new re-
quirement for meta-explanations that will be 
able to bring about action strong enough to 
mitigate its effects. One danger here is that 
the sweeping explanation gives insuffi cient 
attention to what is happening at local scales. 
New epistemological violence can be done to 
different places and peoples as they come to 
symbolize and exemplify certain parts of the 
wider environmental storyline. The subtitle 
of Diamond’s book is how ‘societies choose 
to fail or survive’, and the examples cited are, 
at times, categorized into exemplary models 
to emulate, or into cautionary tales. The 
question is, are you a Tikopia or an Iceland 
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(success stories), or a Rwanda or a Somalia 
(‘ecocides’)? As with the Orientalist discourse 
(Said, 1978), this environmental narrative 
works through a process of crude othering. 
For example, Somalia symbolizes, even epi-
tomizes, collapse, ecocide, an inability to 
do anything about one’s problems, apathy, 
and potentially our own destiny should we 
‘fall’; by contrast, the association between 
the ‘first world’ and a particular form of 
‘civilization’ that must be defended is also 
enshrined. The details of what is happening in 
Somalia are not discussed, but the country is 
cited in the beginning and the end of the book 
as a warning: ‘Either we solve the [environ-
mentally related] problems by then, or the 
problems will undermine not just Somalia but 
also First World societies’ (Diamond, 2005: 
7). The success stories are also questionable. 
For example, little is known about the envir-
onment and settlement history of Tikopia 
prior to the twentieth century. One thing 
that is known, however, is that young Tikopia 
men set off on lone suicide voyages in fragile 
canoes when this ‘success story’ became 
too much for them to bear (Bayliss-Smith, 
personal communication). A second danger 
is that, if the knowledge about a place is not 
correct, then any policies on which they are 
based are likely to be inappropriate. One 
of the main reasons for failures of develop-
ment and conservation is that policies have 
often been based on one-size-fi ts-all models, 
developed on a larger scale.
Despite their recognition of some of these 
concerns, it is also striking that student 
feedback remains nonetheless positive. In 
support of Diamond’s argument, they com-
ment that it ‘brings the environment back in’, 
‘raises awareness’, ‘sets the agenda’ and de-
monstrates ‘how pressing the problem of 
environmental change is’. One student com-
mented: ‘it identifies the choice we have. 
Societies that collapsed didn’t have the know-
ledge and perspective that this book pro-
vides, and it can therefore be used to bring 
about change.’ Many of our masters students 
are already committed to this agenda. Some 
students may also be frustrated by being given 
different readings (not Diamond) that stress 
that problems of development, including 
poverty, disease, food shortages and confl ict, 
are not necessarily ‘natural’, technological 
problems or even results of a lack of economic 
growth, but are complex political problems 
about distribution, rights and access to re-
sources. Whatever the case, the only cer-
tainty that emerges from contemporary 
literature is that achieving sustainable devel-
opment is not easy. The current context of 
global climate change provides the impetus 
to cut through these complexities and this 
hand-wringing with grand theories which 
provide an agenda for global-scale action. 
Theories are contextual; and in this context 
Diamond’s schema is seductive. What seems 
to be happening in Diamond’s work, and else-
where in public debate, is a new tacking back-
wards and forwards between the global-
level environmental problem and the local 
situation, between the macro and the micro 
situation, and there is a new politics to it. The 
new global environmental agenda can ‘trump’ 
local processes and agendas, especially more 
complex political ones.
These dynamics are also evident in policy 
debates in development circles. One example 
of this is the media coverage of a UNEP 
report (2007) claiming that Darfur was the 
‘first climate change war’ (Julian Borger, 
The Guardian, 28 June 2007). Ban Ki-moon, 
the UN Secretary-General, explained in a 
speech:
Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a con-
venient military and political shorthand – an 
ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against 
black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, 
though, and you discover a more complex 
dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political 
causes, the Darfur conflict began as an eco-
logical crisis, arising at least in part from climate 
change. (Ban Ki-Moon, Washington Post 16 
June 2007, added emphasis)
What happens here is that a simplistic narra-
tive that explains confl ict in terms of ‘ancient 
tribal enmities’ between primordial groups 
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in Africa has been replaced with another 
narrative pointing to the climate change 
‘culprit’ in which many years of political and 
historically informed analytical work is over-
looked. De Waal’s (2007) treatment of the 
argument concludes that environmental 
change may be a factor in the problems 
experienced in Darfur, but ultimately the 
explanations for what has happened must 
pay more attention to political processes, 
distribution of rights and the role of govern-
ment. An environmental cause has yet to 
be proved. What is important is not to iden-
tify one factor as more determinant over 
the others, but to examine the way in which 
different factors link up and impact on 
each other. It is this network of causality 
and process that requires investigation and 
understanding.
In economics too, there is a new literature 
that tries to correlate political stability (or 
political effectiveness; levels of democracy) 
with environmental factors. In this ‘resource 
curse’ literature, global-scale analysis is car-
ried out by comparing data from different 
countries to explain historical outcomes in 
terms of whether or not being rich or poor 
in natural resource terms is likely to lead 
to development or to chaos and conflict. 
Sophisticated equations demonstrate links 
between forms of political system and de-
pendence on, or abundance of, natural re-
sources (see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; 
Brunnschweiler, 2008). It is not easy for a 
non-specialist to comment on this technical 
work, but, even to the untrained eye, their 
work raises strong concerns about the data 
on which global and national comparisons 
are made. The literature acknowledges that 
the data are often unreliable and patchy, 
especially in the global South. Further as-
sumptions are included as systems’ stability 
or success are categorized according to broad 
criteria: for example, parliamentary systems 
are assumed to work more in the public good 
than presidential regimes (Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte, 2008). In addition, a project that 
draws correlations between only two factors, 
in this case environmental resources and 
political outcomes, is limited. Situations like 
Darfur show that there are multiple factors 
that infl uence outcomes and confl icts; many 
of the factors are political and historical, 
and they are caused by relations between 
countries as much as they are by relations 
within countries. None of these processes are 
accounted for in the models. This economic 
literature is highly influential, however, as 
when politics and processes are translated 
into numbers the models gain authority. Yet 
the generalized global and national pictures 
they portray may not have included inform-
ation from certain localities, and may not 
fit with what is taking place there. Most 
notably, for example, this literature may be 
used to make policy in parts of Africa where 
the ‘resource curse’ theory is often thought 
most relevant. But some African countries 
are not always represented in the global-scale 
analysis as the data are highly inaccurate 
and/or often lacking.
One question posed by the call for contri-
butions to this Forum was, should geo-
graphers engage with environmentally deter-
ministic arguments in the public arena and 
other disciplines? In response to this, the 
Diamond material, the Darfur case and the 
short discussion of the economic material 
reveal that this environmental determinism 
can take different forms and has different 
agendas and impacts. They are forms of 
what Li (2002) has termed ‘engaging simpli-
fications’, that capture the imagination of 
the public and aim to overcome apathy and 
change behaviour. Many applaud such argu-
ments because they agree with the ends 
that they promote. But, like other engaging 
simplifications, they can distort realities as 
well as result in unintended consequences, 
frequently with negative impacts on the 
least powerful. Simplified models can give 
decision-makers a false sense of confi dence 
that the problems are easy to identify and the 
solutions straightforward to implement. In 
response to this situation, geographers are in 
a good place to trace the more complex ways 
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in which environmental and other factors 
interrelate. Perhaps the challenge is to remain 
engaged with policy and to communicate re-
search and analysis, while maintaining that 
engagement with complexity. The role of the 
academy should be to support these efforts.
Political ecology is one area of geography 
that focuses on unpacking the ways in which 
changing societies and populations inter-
sect with changing environments. Political 
ecology aims to examine social, political and 
environmental processes, and to take into 
account the way in which different scales 
(the local, regional, national and global) inter-
relate. But here, too, political ecologists have 
been criticized for being very good at their 
political and Foucauldian analysis, and much 
less good at understanding environmental 
change and the role it plays (for a review, see 
Walker, 2005). The ascendancy of envir-
onmental-driven analysis in Diamond’s and 
others’ work has some justifi cation. It is im-
portant to engage with environmental pro-
cesses, and to explore, in more depth, the 
way in which the different factors inter-
relate. Geographers, who work with physical 
material processes and sociopolitical ones, 
ought to be leading the field in this area – 
tracing the way in which different scales 
interrelate and making space to understand 
and appreciate local difference and local 
perspectives and interests (wherever that 
‘local’ might be, near or far). Such issues of 
representation and understanding are not 
straightforward, especially in cross-cultural 
contexts, and – worryingly – debates about 
these matters appear to have become less 
rather than more prominent in geographical 
literature in recent years.
Global climate change may be an ‘incon-
venient truth’, but it is likely to be a signifi -
cant one with untold outcomes for every-
one. The full nature of its impacts requires 
full investigation, and policies designed to 
mitigate it deserve to be based on as full an 
understanding as possible of the circum-
stances on the ground, however complex 
such circumstances may prove. Such an 
understanding comes from examining and 
discussing different case-study examples, 
convenient or not. Only in this way will it 
be possible to trace out the varying impact 
of climate change with rigour, and to under-
stand the places and communities in which 
different policies to address it must be based.
Elizabeth E. Watson
University of Cambridge
2 Environmental determinism in geographers’ 
environments
Since the 19th century, the Promethean 
mythology (for which read ‘modernism’) has 
been dominant: the stealing of fi re (for which 
read ‘energy resources’) has apparently al-
lowed the development for humans of a 
world without limits. Where geographers 
take our clues from the natural sciences, we 
adopt those parts of a Promethean narrative 
that suggest that science-based knowledge 
(which many equate to control) is the key to 
all progress. In the social sciences many of us 
are heirs to myths about the perfectibility of 
humankind and we (nearly) all accept a myth 
of a cosmic hierarchy with Homo sapiens well 
above other primates, trees and rocks as a 
working reality: no ‘deep ecology’ for us (cf. 
Fernández-Armesto, this Forum).
I was tempted to begin — and end — 
this piece with the four letters ‘IPCC’. For 
every report of that infl uential body is water-
marked with the message that the limits of 
atmospheric resilience are about to be reached 
and that human societies have to adapt their 
behaviour to prevent any further stretching of 
the apparently fragile envelope that confi nes 
weather and climate to fluctuations with 
which we can cope. Such terseness would of 
course be frowned upon but it reminded me 
of the role of spatial scale. The argument is no 
longer about worker productivity in New 
England or the evolution of the epicanthic 
fold but about the whole planet. At some 
levels, even the most determined post-
modernists have not challenged some of the 
features of the biophysical world as set out 
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in the laws of physics: the presence and 
strength of gravity, for example, or the laws 
regarding the conservation of energy. Maybe 
the part of the second law of thermo-
dynamics that seems to govern time has 
been keenly scrutinized but not even Big Oil 
has yet announced any work on sucking back 
the heat from burning fossil fuels once it has 
reached space. Working ‘inwards’ from that 
perspective, there has arisen a view of the 
globe’s biophysical systems as constituting 
a kind of envelope. Our discussions have 
largely been about whether this is made of 
a fl exible material which can be pushed out-
wards indefinitely or whether it impinges 
differentially from place to place according 
to political or technological regimes.
Other constructions of the world often 
then adopt a particular spatial scale in put-
ting forward their view of the envelope and 
its contents. In doing so, they also bring along 
factors such as the directness of the envir-
onmental processes involved: there is a clear 
difference between the onset of an ocean-
wide tsunami and the decision to grow organic 
carrots; the rate of change is a different 
entity in the regimes of mountain glaciers 
versus the adoption of Green Revolution 
crops in the 1960s, so that there are a series 
of buffers between a physical force or a bio-
logical system which allow societies to 
mediate at the fl exible ends of the directness 
spectrum. The human agency most involved 
(it is no surprise to fi nd) has been access to 
energy resources that can be applied to the 
biophysical systems in the form of techno-
logy. Thus in energy-rich societies the buf-
fers are strongest: as Max Frisch said, in his 
novel Homo faber (1957), ‘Technology is 
a way of organizing the world so that man 
doesn’t have to experience it’.
So, surrounding us all the time but im-
pinging only from time to time and place to 
place there are determinist ideas and policies 
which come through a variety of channels as 
well as, occasionally, the brutal directness 
of a tsunami, an earthquake or a typhoon. 
In the social sciences the most common 
avenue of barely mediated concern is label-
led Malthusian. There are a number of ways 
in which population growth is regarded with 
anxiety. The most social in its orientation is 
the way in which a given society can cope 
with populations that double every 20 years 
or so and in which there are so many young 
people without many future opportunities; at 
the infl exible end of the thinking is the under-
lying notion (derived mostly from ecological 
science) of carrying capacity. There may be, 
it is argued, a finite limit to the number of 
humans that can be fed or watered or kept 
from each others’ throats, and that limit is a 
consequence of the biophysical character of 
the planet mediated through a number of 
feedback mechanisms. Even as I write (June 
2008), the FAO has been having ‘crisis’ 
meetings, a fact related to the oil prices hit-
ting US$130 that same month. After the 
UN Population Conference in Cairo in 1994 
it was rather un-PC to mention Malthus, 
but I think his ghost is now showing itself 
again well beyond the streets of Bath, in 
whose Abbey his memorial is affixed. This 
on-and-off attention span is indicative of the 
way in which many topics that feed into a 
complex discussion seem like temporary 
crystallizations in flows of energy, matter 
and ideas, rather than the hard-edged lumps 
of thinking that dominate any account that 
is in writing.2
Yet, to be repetitive, the climate profes-
sionals are the most direct inheritors of the 
radical environmentalist school of thought 
which has swirled around and through the 
western world since the 1960s. Even though 
the mode of transmission is that of the ‘green-
house gases’, the message is clear: adapt to 
the carbon fl ows of the planet or else suffer 
unpredictable fluctuations of amplitude of 
climate and weather. The more optimistic 
responses, such as those of Bjorn Lomborg, 
argue that the situation is negotiable and 
that money be spent on adapting to rapid 
change rather than trying to prevent it: in 
other words to deny the existence of limits 
to human societies (Lomborg, 2001). To read 
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the material of the more environmentalist 
end of the spectrum, and to see the almost 
desperate attempts of many media to foster 
ways by which to lower our individual car-
bon footprints is perhaps to acknowledge 
that radical environmentalism has been a 
carrier of western Puritanism and that its 
proponents have a little more in common 
with the Taleban than they would care to 
admit. But how long will this last? Media 
attention spans are notoriously short and 
‘democratic’ governments are always wary 
of which voters they might offend. Evoking 
Puritanism, at any rate in the western world, 
brings us back into the sphere of myth.
The Promethean myth is not dead: ideas 
of hi-tech carbon sequestration beneath the 
oceans, deserts covered with solar panels and 
sun-refl ecting mirrors in space are the heirs 
of the hollow stalk, as is the nuclear fusion 
power which is always, it seems, 40 years 
into the future. Most Greek legends have epi-
sodes of hubris followed by those of nemesis 
and environmentalists sometimes point to the 
uncomfortable time that Prometheus spent 
chained to a rock and having his liver pecked 
out by a vulture. So this myth has something 
for everybody, including perhaps the story 
that Zeus eventually freed Prometheus. It 
seems the case that the concatenation of 
Geography with other constructions of the 
world is beset with myths, even though we 
all choose to dress them up in other verbal 
clothing. In such a context the appearance of 
environmental determinism is perhaps like a 
snake in a burrow – you don’t see much of it 
but from time to time it whips out and bites 
you; or maybe it is like that vulture, soaring 
way above and thus ignored until nemesis 
produces some corpses.
Ian Simmons
University of Durham
Part II: Questioning the notion of 
human culture versus the environment
The chimpanzees’ tea party was a spectacle 
I often enjoyed on childhood outings to the 
zoo. Now my generation recalls it with 
embarrassment, and even self-loathing, 
as politically incorrect and injurious to 
chimpanzees’ dignity. The chimps sat at a 
table laden with teatime paraphernalia and 
foodstuffs, and entertained the crowd by 
making a mess. According to one of the 
world’s leading experts on chimpanzee be-
haviour, they probably deliberately hammed 
up the performance (de Waal, 2002: 52). 
We onlookers, however, thought it funny – 
though we may not have expressed it thus – 
because we thought that humans were 
uniquely cultural animals, and that chimps’ 
efforts to imitate our table manners were 
vitiated by a fundamental inability to under-
stand what manners were. Now the joke is 
on us, because half a century of research has 
taught us that we are not alone in possessing 
culture, and that chimpanzees are among a 
number of non-human cultural creatures: 
practitioners, that is, of behaviours that are 
socially but not practically functional and are 
neither instinctive nor advantageous in an 
evolutionary sense. Rather, they are trans-
mitted by tradition and acquired by learning 
(de Waal, 2001; de Waal and Tyack, 2003; 
Hurley and Nudds, 2006; on dolphins, see also 
Pryor and Norris, 1991; Mann et al., 2000).
So humans are not uniquely cultural. There 
is, however, a conspicuous respect in which 
humans still seem peculiar. Other animals’ 
cultures remain more or less static, whereas 
those of humans are highly mutable – even 
volatile. A huge question arises, perhaps the 
biggest question the social sciences (broadly 
defined, including history and human geo-
graphy) are called on to answer or at least 
address: why do human cultures, alone of 
those of cultural animals, change so much? 
The question seems – some might say, 
threatens – to replace history with natural 
history and human agency with the vast im-
personal forces of environment and evolution.
It is reasonable – one might almost say 
natural – to look to environment or evolution 
for explanations. But, as I tried to show in 
one of my books, widely divergent societies 
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have often taken shape in similar or identical 
environments (Fernández-Armesto, 2001). 
Environment changes at rhythms very dif-
ferent from, and generally much slower than, 
those observable in culture. Although there 
are occasional cases, such as large-scale vol-
canic eruptions or the sudden evolution of a 
new and powerful micro-organism, when the 
rhythms of environmental and cultural change 
coincide, these are too infrequent to account 
for all the lurches of culture. So, although we 
can accept, as a matter of common sense, 
that environment infl uences culture, we can 
set it aside as a source of direct explanation 
for the innumerable variations in human cul-
tures that arise over time.
Evolution, too, is bound to be part of any 
picture of cultural behaviour, because, 
although we humans may transcend it, we 
have always to start from the point to which 
it has brought us. All cultural animals are pro-
ducts of evolution and whatever disposes 
them to cultural behaviour must be part of 
the equipment with which evolution has fur-
nished them. The search for a link between 
evolution and culture has a long history (for 
a good account, see Durham, 1991). Here I 
want to address only two currently fashion-
able doctrines – forms of determinism, rooted 
in scientifi c traditions concerning evolution, 
which have helped to shape current or recent 
debate: fi rst, the argument that cultures are 
collections of evolved individuals, whose in-
herited characteristics determine what hap-
pens to human communities; second, the 
claim that cultures, or ‘units’ of which culture 
is said to be composed, behave in ways so 
closely analogous to organisms as to con-
form to evolutionary rules – evolving, for 
instance, by selection of environmentally suc-
cessful variations or by way of competition 
between ‘units’ of culture, self-replicated like 
genes. I want to suggest that neither of these 
doctrines is helpful.
The evidence that some non-human 
animals have culture began to pile up in the 
early 1950s, when investigators in Japan ob-
served a now famous macaque monkey 
instructing her tribe in her newly discovered 
technique of washing the dirt off sweet pota-
toes before eating. Subsequent generations 
learned how to do it and continue the trad-
ition – with some modifi cations – to this day. 
Proof that the practice is a rite rather than a 
crudely useful function is that the monkeys 
will always do the washing, even if humans 
deliver the vegetables ready-cleaned, as if 
in a supermarket (de Waal, 2002: 51). Since 
the discovery of macaque culture, innumer-
able cultural practices have been detected in 
many species of apes and monkeys and also, 
according to investigators in the field, in 
elephants, dolphins and rats. In some cases, 
there is evidence of cultural divergence 
among communities of a single species. In 
some baboon tribes, for instance, males prac-
tise monogamy; in others, they have harems. 
Different chimpanzee communities have 
different technologies; some hunt quite in-
tensively (Stanford, 1998), whereas others 
do not. In different places, orang-utans play 
different games. Yet it remains true to say 
that cultural divergence – which is an index of 
the scale and rate of cultural change – is very 
small in non-human species, compared with 
the immense diversity of human cultures.
To express the problem another way, it 
would be otiose to attempt to write histories 
of the societies of any cultural creatures 
except humans. Even chimpanzees, who are 
in just about every respect the creatures most 
closely comparable to humans, hardly have 
any history. They have politics, which the 
great analyst of chimp political science, Frans 
de Waal, has characterized as Machiavellian 
(de Waal, 1986: 19). But, although one alpha 
male from time to time successfully displaces 
another, the nature of authority in chimpanzee 
communities never changes. It would be 
rash to say that it never could change. One 
of the most curious episodes observed by 
researchers in Tanzania was of a chimp low 
down the ranking among the males of his 
tribe who for a time successfully challenged 
the leaders’ dominance by rolling packing 
cases, appropriated from the primatologists’ 
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camp, across his rivals’ favoured tracks 
through the forest. At fi rst, the incumbents 
were inclined to defer to him in their puzzle-
ment; but his coup did not last long and no 
permanent revolution occurred in the dis-
tribution of power or in the way in which 
chimpanzee leaders emerge. Nonetheless, it 
is tempting to see in this incident evidence 
both of how limited the range of chimpanzee 
political culture is compared to that of humans 
and of how the distance might be narrowed in 
the future (Goodall, 1990; Wrangham et al., 
1994). We no longer have alpha males run-
ning our societies as, presumably, our hominid 
ancestors once did. We have replaced chal-
lenge and combat, which stil l  prevails 
among chimpanzees, with other means of 
selecting leaders, by charisma, sacrality, 
heredity, sagacity, demagogy. But among 
chimpanzees it is already possible for an 
individual to attain temporary ascendancy by 
an innovative strategy. Over time, new kinds 
of political change could become systematic 
in chimpanzee societies, as in our own.
Meanwhile, humans are the only species 
with history. But this form of human distinc-
tiveness has accrued over time. It is not 
‘natural’ to humans in the sense of having been 
a feature of human life since Homo sapiens 
fi rst emerged. On the contrary, as far as we 
can tell, for most of our existence, our spe-
cies has been culturally stable – in key respects 
as unchanging as other species. The earliest 
divergences we can attribute to human cul-
tures arose as a result of the migration of 
Homo sapiens out of our native environment 
in east Africa, about 100,000 years ago. Those 
divergences were consequences of the need 
to adapt to new and previously unexperi-
enced environments, which produced, for 
instance, variants in dress and foraging techni-
ques, and of the sheer distances that arose 
between increasingly sundered commun-
ities. I suspect that separation by distance 
must have stimulated linguistic divergence, 
which – to judge from the huge differences in 
language today between contiguous peoples 
in Australia and New Guinea, who in other 
respects resemble each other closely in culture 
– must have been an early form of societies’ 
mutual differentiation. Even so, the dif-
ferences between widely dispersed peoples 
in the palaeolithic era were small, by recent 
standards, and not much greater than that 
of many other primates. If art is the mirror of 
society, the rate of change in palaeolithic 
cultures was minimal. The recent discovery of 
cave paintings at Chauvet, some 10,000 years 
older than previously known examples of the 
genre, reveals startling continuity in subjects, 
techniques and treatment (Clottes, 2001).
So the peculiar mutability of human society 
has its origins not in ‘human nature’ – whatever 
that is – but in the circumstances of the rela-
tively recent past. The increasing pace of 
change, moreover, is not an inherent pro-
perty of change, but a historical phenomenon. 
It has occurred – for the most part – within a 
relatively well-known and relatively well-
documented period, which can be said to 
have coincided roughly with the Holocene, 
and to have quickened spectacularly in the 
last few centuries.
The critical gap between human and non-
human cultural species therefore demands 
a peculiarly human explanation. Evolution 
seems generally too slow-working a mechan-
ism to meet the case. Even the syncopations 
of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ are too slow 
and too rare. We can measure the pace of 
human evolutionary divergence in our DNA 
(Jorde et al., 1998); the results do not stand 
comparison with the cultural divergence 
historians record (Berry, 2002: 265–73). 
Culture, moreover, seems un-Darwinian 
because it is a story of the survival of the un-
fi ttest. Evolution has delivered, as far as we 
can tell, no increase in the duration of spe-
cies. So we should not demand that it deliver 
more durable cultures. Nonetheless, we have 
to take account of the fact that the most 
adaptive cultures are not the fi ttest for sur-
vival, but the most prone to catastrophe. 
A system which – independently of human 
choice – imposed cultures equipped to survive 
would select for foraging. Cultures which 
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have stuck to that strategy have survived 
for scores of millennia, whereas those that 
have substituted sedentarism, urbanization, 
agriculture and all the other adaptations we 
associate with ‘civilization’ are one with 
Nineveh and Tyre. The societies we class as 
least evolved – least complex, least developed, 
with fewest parts – are those that endure 
longest, while elaborate civilizations collapse. 
Our adaptations bear the fi ngerprints of free 
will precisely because, so far, just about all of 
them have been unsuccessful (Fernández-
Armesto, 2001). Their increasing pace looks 
like a measure of increasing desperation.
The only serious attempt to solve this 
problem – the theory of memes (Dawkins, 
1976: 202–15) – is of little appeal, not least 
because there is no evidence for the exist-
ence of memes, in the sense of evolved ‘units’ 
of culture, or of any mechanism analogous to 
heredity, by which evolution could select 
them for transmission to other cultures. 
According to Richard Dawkins, who first 
described memes and invented the name, a 
meme is a ‘replicating entity’ and ‘a cultural 
trait [that] may have evolved in the way 
that it has, simply because it is advantageous 
to itself’ (Dawkins, 1976: 206, 214, original 
emphasis) – not to the people or society 
who adopt it. It would be inconsistent with 
Dawkins’s concept even to speak of memes 
being ‘adopted’ in any sense that implies 
conscious adoption – rather they colonize 
their host societies, somewhat as parasites 
infest bodies. This is a doubly unsatisfactory 
doctrine. First, it requires another set of ex-
planations to account for why different traits 
achieve different levels of social infl uence: it 
is easy to accept, for instance, that genes for 
brown eyes should prevail over those for blue 
eyes in a body where both are inherited; but 
the same mechanisms cannot explain why, 
say, Islam should prevail over Christianity in 
a society with access to both (Smail, 2008: 
96–97). Second, elements of culture have, 
in the imaginary world of the meme, no 
way of emerging except by a form of self-
replication reminiscent of spontaneous 
generation: innovations occur by way of 
random mutation, rather than as a result 
of human inventiveness. Even Dawkins 
finds this an unsustainable way of thinking 
about culture, crediting Socrates, Leonardo, 
Copernicus and Marconi with ‘contributions’ 
of ‘meme-complexes’ commendable for 
their longevity. This gets close to saying that 
human minds originate cultural traits – which 
is what everyone’s experience suggests. If 
that is so, it is unnecessary to endow memes 
with a life of their own. Humans think them 
up in the first place; so humans can adopt 
them and reject them as they wish.
Indeed, what Dawkins calls cultural traits 
can all fairly be represented as ideas, because 
everything else he includes – technologies, 
techniques, tunes, teachings – do not appear 
on earth fully formed or leap from culture to 
culture except, in the fi rst instance, as purely 
mental facts, communicated between minds. 
Even in the case of an artifact which arrives 
by trade or chance in a milieu where it is un-
familiar, and spreads by being copied, it is 
not effectively transmitted from its culture 
of origin to its host culture unless and until 
a recipient conceives an idea of it. Cultural 
changes, in other words, originate in the 
realm of ideas. I do not mean to assert that 
the mind – or, to focus on exactly what I mean 
by ‘mind’ in the present context, the cap-
acity for generating ideas – is unaffected by 
evolution. As far as we can tell, our capacity 
for thought is itself a product of evolution 
and, if it is true – as we suppose, on the basis 
of our present knowledge – that humans 
have an exceptional capacity for generating 
ideas, evolution should have played some part 
in endowing us with it.
As a working hypothesis, I propose that 
ideas are a byproduct of a well-equipped im-
agination, which in turn is a product of a well-
developed power of anticipation. Evolution 
selects for anticipation, especially in the case 
of hunting animals, who need to be able to 
anticipate the behaviour both of prey and 
of rival predators, often in environments 
which occlude the senses. Homo sapiens 
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needs a relatively rich imagination to make 
up for the feebleness of body, slowness of 
gait and weakness of sight and smell that dis-
advantage us as hunters. This, I suspect, is 
why humans have so many more ideas than 
other primates, who resemble us so closely 
in so many other respects, but who rarely 
or never eat meat and who typically do not 
go hunting. Now that some chimpanzee 
communities have taken this step and have 
embraced the ecology of hunters, I think it is 
unfanciful to speculate that their trajectory of 
change could eventually draw closer to ours, 
as hunting becomes more important in their 
economies, evolution responds accordingly, 
and chimps get ever more imaginative.
However that may be, the link between 
ideas and cultural change is unproblematic. 
We observe our world. We imagine it dif-
ferently. We work to realize our imagined 
world. But this still leaves the increasing 
pace of cultural change unexplained. If I am 
right so far, ideas need to multiply in order 
for cultural change to accelerate. The best-
attested reason for the multiplication of ideas 
is the fertilizing effect of exchange. Ideas 
multiply as the result of dialogue. That is why 
we are here, talking to one another. Cultures 
change, in part, at least, because unfamiliar 
ideas about how to do things impinge from 
outside. For example, the work of Jared 
Diamond has made familiar the notion that 
Eurasia has been an arena of faster change 
than other parts of the world because its 
geography favours intense exchanges of 
culture between its indigenous civilizations 
(Diamond, 1997: 354–75 ff.). Isolation retards 
change, exchange stimulates it.
This helps us understand why for so much 
of the human past cultural change was so slow 
– barely exceeding, as we have seen, the rate 
of change in other cultural species. The story 
of our past has been, for most of the time, 
one of divergence, as human communities 
migrated across the globe and in many cases 
lost touch with one another. Such cultural 
changes as occurred during the period of 
divergence are largely explicable in terms of 
adaptations to the different environments 
human migrants encountered. Subsequently, 
at fi rst very gradually or fi tfully, as sundered 
communities re-established contact, ideas 
oscillated with increasing frequency across 
newly established frontiers, generating or 
contributing to the generation of accelerating 
change (Fernández-Armesto, 2006). Among 
the changes were projects for extending the 
reach of exploration and exchange, and tech-
nologies to effect them: striking examples 
of re-imaginings of the world, realized in 
practice. The beginning of a new, and so far 
relatively short, period of convergence there-
fore coincided with a quickening of change of 
all kinds. The most marked feature of the very 
recent past – which we call globalization – 
is, from one point of view, intensified ex-
change. To put it crudely, change grows out 
of exchange (Fracchia and Lewontin, 2002). 
The more exchange, the more change. Inter-
cultural contacts do not just reshake the 
kaleidoscope of the world; they also multiply 
the crystals it contains.
Felipe Fernández-Armesto
Tufts University
Part III: Engaging with the politics of 
determinist environmental thinking
History is real simple. (Rush Limbaugh, quoted 
in Nash et al., 2000: 6)
The paradox that neo-environmental deter-
minism has apparently convinced so many 
despite its fatal epistemological and empirical 
flaws suggests the need to treat it as part 
of the process of underdevelopment rather 
than as pop science in need of debunking. 
Debunking certainly poses no great challenge 
because environmental determinism’s lack 
of engagement with complex historical 
processes in favor of making simplistic cat-
egorical associations mimics the major 
epistemological defect of racism, sexism, 
and other determinisms (Sluyter, 2005). A 
propensity for fallacious empirical claims 
further undermines neo-environmental 
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determinists’ conclusions (Sluyter, 2003). 
That they nonetheless enjoy some credibility 
thus remains largely inexplicable except as an 
initial effect of a weakening of the nature/
society divide that has long defi ned the found-
ational structure of modernism (Sluyter, 
2002: 215–27). Interminable debunking and 
philosophical speculation, however, have 
come to seem less useful than treating neo-
environmental determinism as an object of 
analysis in research on underdevelopment, 
much as political ecologists have already 
studied the roles of racism, sexism, and 
Orientalism in that phenomenon (Sluyter, 
1999). Such an analysis would at a minimum 
need to focus on how neo-environmental 
determinism has supplanted racism as the 
major pop explanation for underdevelopment 
and on how neo-environmental determinism 
emerges in and impacts particular sites of 
underdevelopment, including universities.
Neo-environmental determinism certainly 
seems to have supplanted racism as the major 
pop science explanation for underdevelop-
ment. In general terms, that brand of racism 
essentializes peoples of non-European origin 
as forever incapable of creativity and produc-
tivity or, at best, as requiring a long colonial 
apprenticeship before achieving the cap-
acity for independence and development. In 
an effort to supplant such ideas, the author 
of one of the best-known neo-environmental 
determinist books on underdevelopment 
actually claims he wrote Guns, germs, and 
steel: the fate of human societies as a counter-
argument to racism (Diamond, 1997: 18–25). 
Ironically, racist and environmental deter-
minist explanations of underdevelopment 
share so many key characteristics that they 
complement rather than counter each other. 
Both ignore colonial and (post)colonial pro-
cesses, with Diamond ending Guns, germs, 
and steel some five centuries ago, just as 
the dichotomy between the developed and 
underdeveloped worlds was beginning to 
emerge. Both instead emphasize supposedly 
innate characteristics, genetic in one case 
and geological in the other. Diamond’s 
(1997: 376–401) attempt to explain African 
underdevelopment thus differs from the 
racist one he claims to counter only by retreat-
ing from genetic determinants to environ-
mental ones, most basically the relatively 
small surface area and meridional orien-
tation of that continent. Thus, he argues, 
Africa’s blackness has not determined its 
underdevelopment; instead, its environ-
ment has determined both its blackness and 
its underdevelopment. Racism and neo-
environmental determinism, then, equally 
obfuscate the historical processes that ex-
plain underdevelopment in favor of cor-
relating racial or environmental categories to 
ones of wealth and power, eliding the pos-
sibilities for constructive change that begin 
with acceptance of social responsibility and 
come to fruition through restructuration of 
social relations.
Given that racist and environmental deter-
minist arguments play the same obfuscating 
role, the replacement of the former by the 
latter must involve a response to some sort 
of dynamism in the process of underdevelop-
ment itself. One possible source relates to 
the diasporas of (post)colonial peoples that 
began during the cold war: Algerians to 
France, Indonesians to the Netherlands, 
Indians to the UK, Cubans and other Latinos 
to the USA, and so on. US Census 2000 
provides one measure of the scale of that 
phenomenon: 35.3 million people self-
identifi ed as Hispanic or Latino, already by 
then 12.5% of the total population and pro-
jected to grow to 30% by 2050 (Therrien 
and Ramirez, 2000). Such (post)colonial 
migration contrasts markedly with that of 
the 1800s and early 1900s, when European 
groups such as Irish, Italians, and Germans 
comprised the largest ethnic minorities in 
the USA. In addition to underdeveloped 
countries having replaced European ones as 
the main sources of migrants, Europe itself 
has become a destination, a role previously 
fi lled largely by its settler colonies such as the 
USA. Moreover, migrants have increasingly 
become transnational in that they maintain 
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persistent connections to their origin com-
munities through remittances, circular migra-
tion, and voting (Davis, 2000).
As (post)colonial underdevelopment pro-
cesses have relocated ever larger numbers of 
African, Latin American, and Asian workers 
toward developed countries, the racist 
obfuscation of underdevelopment has be-
come counterproductive to neoliberal poli-
cies. Characterizing immigrants as racially 
incapable of creativity and productivity would 
alienate them rather than co-opt them as 
voters, workers, and consumers. Even char-
acterizing them as requiring long tutelage 
before becoming productive seems inane 
give the many recruited directly into the high-
tech industries of Europe and the USA.
Neo-environmental determinism provides 
neoliberals with a strategic revision of the 
racist obfuscation by shifting the supposed 
cause of underdevelopment from people to 
environment, from genes to geology. Latinos 
living in the USA can thereby be producers 
and consumers of value-added goods while 
their countries of origin remain underdevel-
oped suppliers of raw materials and cheap 
labor because of presumed environmentally 
deficiencies. Neo-environmental deter-
minism thus maintains the obfuscations of 
racism but with the added benefi t of facili-
tating the vast transfer of skilled labor and 
mass consumption from the underdeveloped 
world to the developed world while main-
taining their existing political-economic 
relations.
Beyond elaborating understanding of that 
global context, a political ecology of neo-
environmental determinism would have to 
focus on particular sites of underdevelop-
ment, including universities. Given the part 
that academics have played in revising racism 
into neo-environmental determinism, univer-
sities might actually be the most pertinent 
sites of all. Political ecologists can in that 
sense begin to treat universities much as 
they do the African villages, Amazonian 
forest preserves, international development 
organizations, or biotech corporations that 
they typically study. Each such site provides 
a different type of entry into the process 
of underdevelopment, and even sites such 
as university departments that seem far re-
moved from the negative social and environ-
mental effects on the ground in Africa or Asia 
might yield an essential explanatory element.
In his latest book, The university in chains, 
Henry Giroux (2007) provides some insight 
into how neoliberals have secured academic 
sanction for an obfuscating explanation of 
underdevelopment that facilitates avoid-
ance of democratic accountability for social 
and environmental destruction. As a point 
of departure, he uses Dwight Eisenhower’s 
final speech as US President, when on 17 
January 1961 he warned of the ‘acquisition 
of unwarranted infl uence, whether sought or 
unsought, by the military-industrial complex’ 
(Eisenhower, quoted in Giroux, 2007: 14). 
But Giroux extends that complex to include 
universities, terming it the military-industrial-
academic complex. In part his insights into 
that extended alliance derive, as do my own, 
from experiences while a member of the 
faculty at the Pennsylvania State University, 
commonly known as Penn State (Giroux, 
2007: 107–108). During the 1950s, Milton 
Eisenhower, Dwight’s brother, served as pre-
sident of Penn State and used his Pentagon 
connections to establish that university as 
a major defense contractor. That process 
marked the campus landscape with the 
secretive Applied Research Laboratory, the 
Breazeale Nuclear Reactor, and the Garfi eld 
Thomas Water Tunnel, used to design sub-
marine hulls and torpedoes.
Now, as Giroux demonstrates, the pres-
sures on academics to adopt the obfuscating 
explanations that serve neoliberal policy 
have never been greater. His analysis ranges 
from quantifying sources of research funding 
to textual deconstruction, and draws three 
compelling conclusions. First, the military-
industrial-academic complex has over the 
past two decades drawn in many more uni-
versities than those such as Penn State 
that established strong connections to the 
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Department of Defense during the cold war. 
Second, that process threatens the demo-
cratic foundations of US society. Third, aca-
demic faculty and students can counter that 
process through critical research, teaching, 
and learning.
With his focus on cultural studies and 
critical pedagogy, Giroux does not directly 
address the emergence of neo-environmental 
determinism at universities, but he does 
point political ecologists toward the sorts 
of questions that will lead to greater under-
standing of that phenomenon and therefore 
the processes of underdevelopment. To 
illustrate, we can use Diamond once again. 
As a biologist, he lacks the expertise to study 
underdevelopment; his research on that 
topic therefore lacks methodological and 
empirical rigor, and he consequently has to 
publish it as popular science rather than in 
refereed, scholarly journals. Why under those 
circumstances would UCLA, putatively an 
intellectual meritocracy dedicated to rigorous 
scholarship and education, appoint him as 
a professor of geography?3 Who approved 
that appointment and who resisted? Who 
benefited from it and how? Who invited 
him to present the opening plenary at the 
2007 Association of American Geographers 
meeting? Who promoted that choice and 
who resisted it? Who benefi ted from it and 
how? Does Diamond’s new status as a geo-
grapher, conferred by some at UCLA and 
endorsed by others at the AAG, influence 
the reception of his arguments in aca-
demic disciplines beyond geography, in gov-
ernment, and among the general public? 
Does that status influence the adoption of 
neo-environmental determinism within and 
beyond the discipline of geography or deepen 
the intellectual chasm between its physical 
and human component parts (Sluyter et al., 
2006)? Will nature/society research within 
and beyond geography become less rig-
orous and capable under the influence of 
neo-environmental determinism, resulting 
in increasingly poorer rather than better 
understandings of underdevelopment?
Giroux also provides political ecologists 
with guidance on the sorts of data and an-
alysis available to answer such questions. 
Such research should involve deconstruc-
tion of the minutes of meetings recovered 
from the archives of academic societies and 
university departments; of speeches and 
papers by neo-environmental determinists; 
of their books; and of syllabi in geography and 
other disciplines. It should include analysis 
of the distribution of positive and negative 
book reviews as well as of citation patterns 
across different disciplines and nationalities. It 
should include participant observation of the 
military-industrial-academic complex to, for 
example, determine the prevalence of neo-
environmental determinist thinking among 
military clients of academic geographers 
(Potter and Sluyter, 2007). And, of course, it 
should follow the money.
If political ecologists are to understand 
neo-environmental determinism as part of 
the process of underdevelopment, engaging 
such questions about our own universities 
becomes as necessary as research on con-
servation policy in Africa, genetically modi-
fied soybeans in South America, or soil 
erosion in Asia.
Andrew Sluyter
Louisiana State University
Notes
 1. However, there are also parallels between earlier 
environmental determinisms and today in terms of 
imperial geopolitics (cf. Peet, 1985; Godlewska and 
Smith, 1994), and a concern to celebrate the ‘local’ 
(culture or ecology) in the face of homo-genization 
and/or destruction.
 2. With the possible exception of poetry perhaps: let 
us have some new anthologies of ‘green’ poetry 
that go beyond the scenery-and-fl owers surfaces.
 3. I completed this essay about half a year before the 
news broke that some of the native peoples Jared 
Diamond has used in his publications are now suing 
him for libel, a development that has prompted more 
geographers to begin asking how he ever gained the 
credibility to write about underdevelopment given 
him by a faculty position in a geography depart-
ment and plenary lectures at the AAG meetings 
(the 20 April 2009 court summons is available at 
18 Progress in Human Geography
www.stinkyjournalism.org/misc/Mandingo_and_
Wemp_vs_Advance_Publications_and_Jared_
Diamond.pdf, last accessed 1 June 2009).
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